This paper considers a smooth and noisy version of the statistical prediction model studied in the herdingrinformational cascades literature and compares market and optimal learning. The latter is characterized by defining a decentralized welfare benchmark as the solution to an infinite horizon team problem. Market behavior involves herding, in the sense that agents put too little weight on their private information for any given precision of public information, and yields underinvestment in the production of public information. However, both market and optimal learning involve slow learning. Examples of the model include learning by doing, reaching consensus, and consumer learning about quality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D83. ᮊ 1997 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
Recent work has studied learning from others in the context of a simple statistical model where agents have to predict in sequence as accurately as Ž . possible a random variable a ''correct'' option . Apparently surprising Ž . outcomes may emerge from the decisions of rational Bayesian agents who may end up disregarding their own private information and taking Ž actions based only on public information a situation referred to as an . informational cascade by Bikhchandani et al., 1992 . A result is that the whole sequence of agents may ''herd'' and choose a ''wrong'' action Ž . 1 Banerjee, 1992 . Ž Herd behavior needs payoffs to be nonregular degenerate as in Baner-. jee, 1992 or action spaces to be not rich enough to allow for appropriate Ž . responses to information discrete as in Bikhchandani et al., 1992 . Other-Ž . wise, with continuous action spaces containing potentially optimal actions Ž and regular payoffs convergence to the correct action obtains see Baner-. jee, 1992, and Lee, 1993 . Further, in a smooth and noisy context, work on ''learning in rational expectations'' shows that prices slowly reveal an unknown parameter in a model where firms learn from the aggregate Ž . 2 information of other firms Vives, 1993 . In other words, convergence obtains but at a slow rate.
The received literature leaves open the analysis of the welfare issue. It is easy to see that the outcomes may be inefficient from the welfare point of view given the externality present in learning from others. Indeed, an agent when responding to her private information will not take into account the future benefit to other agents of her action. This leads naturally to a welfare-based definition of herding as a departure of the weight agents put on private information from optimal behavior according to an appropriately defined welfare benchmark. There will be herding if Ž agents rely too much on public information putting too little weight on . their private information .
In the present paper we consider a model of learning from others which is a smooth and noisy version of the statistical prediction model used in the herding literature. The presence of noise in the public signals means that the latter are not sufficient statistics of the information of agents. The model is infinite-horizon and the interaction of agents in the market produces a public aggregate noisy statistic of the agents' actions. Agents, Ž based on private and public information, strive to minimize the mean . square prediction error of a random variable . Ž . Equipped with this model we first review market Bayesian learning behavior and then we analyze socially optimal learning. We take as the social optimum benchmark the team solution which assigns decision rules to agents to minimize the discounted sum of prediction errors taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy. This Ž . decentralized benchmark, in the tradition of team theory Radner, 1962 , ignores possible incentive problems and focuses on coordinating decisions to minimize the discounted prediction errors. 2 This work is a continuation of the tradition of studying aggregation of information by Ž prices and rational expectations models Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980;  . Ž Hellwig, 1980 and their dynamic extensions see, for example, Townsend, 1978; Kyle, 1985; . Feldman, 1987; and Jordan, 1992a . A rate of convergence result for a class of myopic Ž . Bayesian processes has been obtained by Jordan 1992b . The market solution involves an information externality: An agent, when responding to his private information, does not take into account the benefit produced in terms of increased informativeness of public informa-Ž tion in the future which translates into lower future prediction errors or . 3 period losses . The team solution does internalize this externality and involves experimentation. The team manager knows that by increasing the response of agents to private information short-term losses also increase, but there is the benefit of the additional public information gained. 4 
Ž
The analysis of the market solution confirms previous results Vives, . 1993 on slow convergence in the context of the prediction model. Indeed, it is shown that predictions do converge to the correct action , but they do it slowly. Ž The solution to the welfare program the infinite horizon stochastic . team optimization problem is characterized using dynamic programming methods under the assumption that the team manager assigns linear decision rules to agents. The result is that, provided the discount rate is finite, the market underin¨ests in information in two precise senses. First, for a given accumulated informativeness of public information, the team solution calls for a larger response of agents to private information than the market. That is, agents ''herd'' or rely too much on public information according to the welfare benchmark. Second, at any period the informa-Ž tiveness of public information is larger at the team solution that is, the . team solution accumulates more public information than the market . Furthermore, simulations uncover that the relative welfare loss of the market with respect to the team solution can be quite large. Nevertheless, Ž . the market does not distort the asymptotic speed at which agents learn.
In order to motivate the model think of a situation of investment with macroeconomic uncertainty represented by the random variable which will determine the profitability of investment. At each period there is an independent probability 1 y ␦ that the uncertainty is resolved. Firms invest by taking into account that the profits of their accumulated investment will depend on the realization of . The investment of a firm will be 3 The literature contains many instances of analysis of information externalities. Some Stein 1987 , Rob 1991 , Caplin and Leahy 1994 , and Chamley and Gale Ž . 1994 The trade-off between short-term profit maximization and information accumulation is typical of optimal learning models. There are many examples in the literature where optimal learning procedures, precisely because of this trade-off, lead only to partial or no learning Žsee, for example, Rothschild, 1974; Grossman et al., 1977; McLennan, 1984; Kihlstrom et al., 1984; Easley and Kiefer, 1988; Nyarko, 1991; Aghion et al., 1991; and Bolton and Harris, . 1993 . directly linked to its prediction of . To predict each firm will have access to a private signal as well as to public information, which is formed by aggregate past investment figures compiled by a government agency. Data on aggregate investment incorporates measurement error.
5 In consequence, at each period a noisy measure of aggregate investment of the last period is made public. The issue is whether, and if so, how fast, the repeated announcement of the aggregate investment figures reveals . The result according to our paper is that information is revealed slowly and that individual firms put too little weight on their private information from a social point of view.
At a more abstract level we could think about the reaching of consensus in the common knowledge literature. It has been shown that repeated public announcements of a stochastically monotone aggregate statistic of conditional expectations, which need not be common knowledge, lead to Ž consensus Page, 1986, and Nielsen et al., 1990, following up . 6 on Aumann, 1976 . In the model presented in this paper, repeated public announcements of a linear noisy function of agents' conditional expectations leads to consensus, but slowly. We could say, rephrasing a result in Ž . the literature Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1982 , that in the presence of noisy public information ''we cannot disagree forever but we can disagree for a long time.'' The stylized statistical model presented can also provide a statistical microfoundation in a world of private information of the learning cur¨e and can be extended to encompass short-li¨ed agents. An application of the latter model to consumers learning about the quality of a product is presented. The model with short-lived agents has a direct link with the usual sequential herdingrinformational cascades model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 reviews market learning. Section 4 studies optimal learning and compares it to the market solution. Section 5 considers short-lived agents. Concluding remarks follow. 5 For example, quarterly data on national accounts are subject to measurement error. 6 In the iterative process, individuals compute conditional expectations with the information they have available and the aggregate statistic is announced. Individuals then recompute their expectations on the basis of their private information plus the new public information, and the process continues. The aggregate statistic is supposed to represent the outcome of the interaction of agents in a reduced form way. In many instances market interaction will nevertheless provide agents with only a noisy version of an aggregate statistic of individual conditional expectations due to the presence of noise in the communication channels, random traders, demand or supply shocks, etc.
THE MODEL
Consider an infinite horizon model n s 0, 1, . . . , with a continuum of w x Ž long-lived agents indexed in the unit interval 0, 1 endowed with the . Lebesgue measure . Let be a random variable, unobservable to the Ž agents, normally distributed with mean set equal to 0 to simplify 2 2 . Ž Ž . . notation and finite variance ;N , . The payoff to an agent in Ž . 2 period n when choosing an action q is y y q . In period n the in in Ž . agent has available an information vector I to de described shortly . At in any period there is an independent probability 1 y ␦ , with 1 ) Myopic behavior, that is, agent i in period n trying to minimize the Ž . mean square error in predicting the random variable , is individually optimal in the present framework. This is so because the agent is infinitesimal and he cannot affect the public statistics. That is, agent i in period n solves the problem 2 < Min E y q I .
Ž .
Ä 4 q in Ž < . As is well known, the solution to this problem is q s E I . properties. An outline of the analysis is presented here; for details see the Ž . Appendix and for related results and proofs see Vives 1993 . Normality and the recursive structure of the model imply that q s in Ž < . 
The posterior mean of is a weighted average of the signals of the Ž agents with weights according to their precisions the private signal with . precision and the public with precision . Note that the ''discount'' ␦ ny1 plays no role in the market solution since myopic behavior is individually optimal.
The induced dynamics in are driven by a self-correcting property of n learning from others whenever agents are imperfectly informed and public information is not a sufficient statistic of the information agents have Ž . Vives, 1993, and Sørensen, 1995 . Indeed, the weight given to private information ␣ is decreasing in the precision of public information n , and the lower ␣ is the less information is incorporated in the public ny 1 n statistic p . Learning is self-defeating: a higher inherited precision of n public information induces a low current response to private informany 1 tion ␣ , which in turn yields a lower increase in public precision. Conn versely, learning is self-enhancing: a lower inherited induces a high ny 1 current ␣ , which in turn yields a larger increase in . The self-enhancing n n aspect means that public precision will be accumulated unboundedly. If n this were not the case the weight given to private precision would be bounded away from zero, necessarily implying that grows unboundedly, n a contradiction. 8 The self-defeating aspect means that accumulation is slow. As tends to infinity, ␣ tends to zero and the signal-to-noise ratio n n in the new information about in p , ␣ q u , worsens. The amount of n n n new information incorporated in p is asymptotically vanishing. The result n is that tends to infinity with n not at the usual linear rate but more n 8 Ž . Similarly, in Banerjee and Fudenberg 1995 convergence to efficiency is obtained when people use samples larger than one because this allows the possibility of ''mixed'' samples which are relatively uninformative and consequently induces agents to rely on their private information and enhance the information flow into the system. This is again the self-enhancing aspect of learning from others. 
. Note that L is independent of i n in n Ž . Ž < . since both the information structure and the strategies q I s E I n in in
Ž . Ž . riod loss is decreasing in the precision of private and public ny1
information. The following proposition states the results so far.
Ž . PROPOSITION 3.1. i The response to pri¨ate information ␣ ª 0 and the n n precision of public information ª ϱ as n ª ϱ.
ii The precision is of the order of n and ␣ is of the order of n n y 1 r 3 y 1 r 3
COROLLARY. The order of magnitude of the loss L is n y1r3 .
n From Proposition 3.1 it is easy to infer that public information n Ž . converges almost surely to because its precision goes to infinity at 
The next proposition states the result formally. Denote by ª conver-
The market solution involves an information externality. Indeed, a larger response to private information at period n induces a larger precision of Ž public information and a lower welfare loss next period L s q n n q 1
. y 1 Ž and in all subsequent periods for given responses to private inforn . mation . Agents when deciding what action to choose do not take into account that the response to their private information determines the precision of the public information next period. This information externality induces agents to respond too little to their private information.
An appropriate welfare benchmark has to respect the private information structure of the economy and has to weigh the welfare losses of the different periods. Ž Welfare losses are discounted with discount factor ␦, 1 ) ␦ G 0 consistently with the unknown having an independent probability of 1 y ␦ . of being revealed in any period . I will take as a decentralized welfare benchmark the team solution where the planner is able to impose decision Ž rules on agents but cannot manipulate the information flows in particular, . it has no access to their private information . Furthermore, the planner will be restricted to using linear rules, the same family of simple rules that agents in the market use. This means that the planner needs to convey to the agents only a number, the weight they should put on their private information. The requirement is appealing since it corresponds to a low level of complexity in the instructions of the team manager to the agents, communicating the value of one behavioral parameter. In summary, it is assumed that the planner can impose a linear decision rule on agent i as a Ž . function of her information vector, q I , where, as before, I s in in in
The results extend to the case in which agents have different precisions of signals Ž . provided that there is no positive mass of agents perfectly informed see Vives, 1993 . If this ' were the case then convergence would obtain at the standard rate 1r n . This is so since perfectly informed agents do not learn from public information and therefore put a constant Ž . weight on their perfect signals. The outcome is that a constant amount of information is incorporated into the public statistic.
The planner has an incentive to depart from the myopic minimization of the period loss and ''experiment'' to increase the informativeness of public information. The experimentation comes in the form of imposing an increased response to private information, over and above the market response. This experimentation yields a long-run benefit but comes at the cost of increasing short-term losses.
Ž . Given decision rules q I , the average expected loss in period n is in in 1 Ž Ž . . 2 then H E y q I di. Furthermore, given the structure of our prob-0 i n i n lem there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to symmetric rules Ž . Ž . Ž . see Footnote 11 below : q I s q I for all i. The loss in period n is
The objective of the team is to minimize Ý ϱ ␦ n L , choosing a se-
linear respectively in the information
The analysis can proceed as in the market in ns0 in i case. Given the linear strategies imposed by the center, q s a s q
, where z s a q u is the new informa-0 in n n n n n n tion in p . As before we can then write q s a s q c , with c a real n in n i n ny1 n number and the sufficient statistic for public information. Recall that 
choosing a sequence of real numbers a , with a s A s 0.
It is immediate that the team solution calls for the weight of private Ž information to be no less than the market weight for a given accumulated . public precision and that it accumulates public precision in an unbounded way.
11 Asymmetric rules cannot improve upon the symmetric case. First of all, using asymmetric weights a to the signals of different agents s , it is still optimal to set the weights to public in i Ž information so that c s 1 y a the reason is as before that they do not have any 
Ä 4 ϱ Ž be no smaller . Therefore, at an optimal solution a , a G r q n ns0 n . Ä 4 ϱ . Now, let us show that ª ϱ. The sequence is increasing. If ny 1 n n n s 0 n it is bounded above then necessarily a ª 0. Let be an upper bound on
The team problem can be posed in a classical dynamic programming Ä 4 ϱ Ž framework by taking the sequence A as control note that A y n ns0 n 2 . A s a . Given that s q A , this is equivalent to taking the ny 1 n n u n sequence of precisions of public information as controls. The reformulated problem is then
The team problem is equivalent also to the solution of the functional equation
BG A Ž The result follows since attention can be restricted for an appropriate . 
The solution V и to the functional equation is the¨alue function associated to the team problem. It is easily seen that at an optimal solution, as tends to ϱ with n, a tends to 0. Indeed, the optimal n n solution requires the short-run loss to tend to zero as n grows and consequently public precision must be accumulated unboundedly and the weight given to private information must correspondingly tend to zero. 
infinity. B
In order to characterize the optimal solution further I consider the dynamic programming problem restricting attention to coefficients a lying n in the unit interval. As we have seen this is not restrictive since at any solution a ª 0, and in any case we are interested in the dynamics for n n n 12 Ž . large. Denote by g и the policy function of our dynamic problem. The Ž . Ž . characterization of V и and g и is given in Propositions 4.3 and 4.4.
Given that A y A s a 2 , we can write the feasibility correspondence The key fact that V is strictly decreasing in the accumulated precision of public information should be clear since a higher accumulated precision Ž . today generates uniformly strictly lower period losses for all feasible sequences from then on. 12 For all simulations performedᎏthe results of which are summarized belowᎏa lies in n the unit interval for all n. Ž .
PROPOSITION 4.4. There is a continuous policy function g: R ª R
For ␦ s 0 the market solution is obtained. At period n, a s ␣ is n n chosen to minimize L without regard to future losses. With ␦ ) 0 and n given a certain accumulated precision the optimal program always calls for a larger response to private information because it internalizes the information externality, the benefit of a larger response today in lowering future losses. In other words, agents herd and rely too little on their private information at the market solution. This does not mean that the optimal program involves a uniformly larger response to private informa-Ž . tion overtime a ) ␣ for all n since the optimum accumulates more n n public precision. In fact, as we will see from the results of simulations, there is a critical n* after which the optimal program calls for a lower response to private information than to the market in order to reap the benefits of an initial accumulation phase. Simulations 13 produce the following results:
Ž . 1 For any n, the accumulated precision is increasing in the n Ž . discount factor ␦. See Fig. 1 .
Ž .
2 For ␦ ) 0 there is a n* such that a ) ␣ for n -n* and a -␣ n n n n for n ) n*. The length n* represents the ''investment'' or experimentation Ž phase of the team program and it is increasing in ␦ larger weight to the 13 Simulations have been performed for a horizon of N periods approximating the infinite horizon with the discounted loss implied by a constant public precision from period N q 1 on Ž . at the level of public precision in period N. That is, the total present n s 0 discounted loss Nq 1 Ž . from period N q 1 on when the public precision in period N is equals ␦ r 1 y ␦ . . Ž . future and more precise private information and decreasing in u Ž . 14 noisier public signals .
For n large small L is decreasing increasing in the discount n factor ␦. The period loss for n large displays the opposite pattern to : L n n is smaller for larger ␦. For n small the ranking is reversed since in the first periods investment in public information, with a larger than the market n solution ␣ for positive discounts, implies a larger loss.
The relative welfare loss of the market solution with respect to the Ž team solution that is, the difference between the total discounted loss at the market and the team solutions divided by the total discounted loss at . Table I .
We have characterized up to now the information externality arising in the market solution as compared with the team optimal solution. Furthermore, from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we know that as n tends to infinity at the team solution public precision accumulates unboundedly and the response to private information tends to zero. The question arises then as to whether the market solution distorts the rate at which public information is accumulated. Proposition 4.6 makes clear that this is not the case. Proof. We show that at the optimal solution is of the order of n 1r3 ,
a is of the order of n , and A s 3 , exactly as in the n ϱ u market solution. The result follows as in the market case since I claim that at the optimal solution a tends to as n tends to infinity. In order n ny1 Ž Ž . . to prove the claim note that the optimal solution fulfills H g A , A q 1 14 Note that with a finite horizon the existence of n* as claimed is clear. In the last period, say N, there is no future and therefore the optimal solution is just Bayesian updating given
: a s r q . Since ) the market preci-
. sion we have that a -␣ . On the other hand, for n low the optimal solution will call for N N an increased response to private information. 
q ␦VЈ A s 0 for any n. As n tends to 1 n n y1 n Ž . Ž infinity so does A and consequently VЈ A tends to 0 see Proposition
s 1r y 1 y a r a tends to 1 n n y1 n n n y 1 zero as n tends to infinity. The claim follows since a tends to zero with n n Ž . Proposition 4.2 . B Slow learning at the market solution cannot be blamed on the information externality. Indeed, it is optimal to learn slowly even when the information externality is accounted for. For a large enough accumulated public precision the optimal program looks very similar to the market Ž problem in technical terms, VЈ tends to zero or V ''flattens out'' as public . precision increases unboundedly . The reason is that to accumulate public precision faster would entail too large a departure from the minimization of current expected losses. Note in particular that to put asymptotically a constant positive weight on private information and consequently obtain an increase in precision which is linear in n is not optimal. The weight given to private information a must tend asymptotically to zero as public n information precision increases without bound.
15 Proposition 3.2 on the convergence of to holds also for optimal learning. Given that the n above intuition does not rely on linearity it seems plausible to conjecture that the optimality of the rate of learning result is not an artifact of the requirement that the team uses linear rules, as in the market case.
In summary, the team solution involves the same rate of convergence of Ž . public information to Proposition 4.6 although the market uniformly Ž . accumulates less information Proposition 4.5 . In other words, the information externality present in the market solution leads to underinvestment in public precision but it does not distort the rate of learning.
EXAMPLE. Models of learning by doing usually assume that unit production costs decrease with the total accumulated production. There is empirical evidence of learning by doing on production processes which involve complex coordinated labor operations like aircraft assembly and, more recently, in computers. The applied literature emphasizes the importance of group effort and ''integrated adaptation effort'' in the explanation Ž . of the learning curve see, for example, Baloff, 1966 . Improved coordination seems to be at the root of improved productivity. The model presented can be interpreted as a team problem to coordinate workers to minimize the expected costs of production. The problem of the team is to coordinate workers to minimize the expected costs of production. The Ž . coordination problem takes a very simple and extreme form: Costs are lower the closer the actions of workers are to an unknown parameter . The total expected cost of output in production round n is proportional to 1 Ž
. 2 H Eyq di where q is the action of worker i in period n. Worker 0 i n i n interaction reveals the statistic p . The team manager can impose decision n rules on the workers which are measurable in the information they have. Our theory predicts that independently of whether the team manager Ž behaves myopically or as a long-run optimizer taking into account the . learning externality and solving the discounted welfare problem the rate of learning as given by the precision of public information , and consen Ž .
y 1 r 3 quently the period loss expected unit cost , will be of the order of n .
15 As in the market case, the new information in the public signal p , z s a q u , is n n n n asymptotically pure noise and convergence of public information to is slowed down.
n This means that expected cost will decline at the rate n y1r3 . The value Ž .
y 16 s 1r3 for C n s k n is typical for airframes.
A VARIATION: SHORT-LIVED AGENTS
The model presented can be easily extended to encompass short-run Ž . one period lived agents who want to minimize the mean square error of Ž . predicting . It is assumed that their signals given are uncorrelated across generations and have correlation among members of the same generation. If this correlation is perfect there is a representative agent Ž each period and the model is purely sequential like most models of . herding with agents taking actions in turn.
Agent i in period n has available a pri¨ate signal s s q , where in in y accumulated production of n is of the form C n s kn with between 0 and 1 and k a constant. The n y1 r3 rate is typical for airframes and corresponds to a 20% ''progress ratio''
Žthat is, the proportionate reduction of per-unit labor input when the cumulated output . doubles; see Fellner, 1969 . Progress ratios oscillate in empirical studies between 20 and 30%. Ž . See Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 98᎐99. 17 This convention is in accord with the finite-dimensional version of the stochastic process Ž . of the error terms. Let , . . . , be Normal random variables with zero mean, Var
, s 1 q k y 1 rk, for any j s 1, . . . , k. That is, the average of the
error terms is normally distributed with mean zero, and variance and covariance with any 2 Ž Ž . . Ž Ž . . individual error 1 q k y 1 rk. As k goes to infinity 1 q k y 1 rk tends to .
18 It is interesting to note also that the formal analysis of the model would be unchanged if is n s q n q 1 and the order of L is n . In this case An example is provided by consumers learning about quality. In each period there are many consumers of two types: ''rational'' and ''noise'' or ''random.'' All consumers are endowed with a utility function which is linear with respect to money. Consumers only differ in their information and are one-period lived. Generation t, consumer i's utility consuming q , experience of a previous consumer or an independent test of the product . Given that consumer in's idiosyncrasy is uncorrelated with all other in random variables in the environment and that the consumer learns q in Ž < . Ž < . only after consuming the good, we have that E q I s E I .
in in in
Assume for simplicity that firms produce at zero cost and that prices are fixed at marginal cost. Expected utility maximization plus price taking Ž . Ž < . behavior at zero price imply that q s E I . If u denotes the in in n purchases of the random consumers, then aggregate demand will be The results imply that consumers will learn slowly quality from quantities consumed or market shares and that they will be too conservative, with respect to the welfare benchmark, in responding to their private information. Further, slow learning by consumers enhances the possibilities of Ž firms manipulating consumer beliefs signal-jam the inferences consumers . make from market shares; see Caminal and Vives, 1996 . 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS Learning from others via noisy public statistics in a ''smooth'' environ-Ž . ment continuous payoffs and actions spaces is successful, agents end up discovering the truth, but slow even if learning is socially optimal. Market learning nevertheless involves an information externality which induces a too low accumulation of public precision, that is, underinvestment in public information. The results have been obtained in a purely statistical model where agents try to minimize the mean square error of prediction. Several economic problems which fit the framework have been presented.
A question may arise in regard to the robustness of results to less restrictive assumptions on the formulation of the model. For example, relaxing the assumptions of a continuum of agents, mean square error Ž . prediction in favor of more general concave preferences , and normal distributions. The extension of the results to finite populations should present no problems. Furthermore, it seems plausible to conjecture that convergence to the correct action will obtain under general conditions and Ž even that convergence will be ''slow'' in the presence of noise although certainly it need not be the n y1r3 rate which arises in the linear-normal . framework . By ''slow'' I mean strictly less than the usual n . The intuition is that with smooth payoffs and continuous strategy spaces actions can be fine-tuned to information and eventual learning of should obtain, but convergence has to be slow since otherwise the benefits of accumulated public information would never be enjoyed. Both in market and optimal learning schemes imperfectly informed agents have to put decreasing weight on their private information as public information improves, indeed, zero in the limit when public information reveals . The rate of convergence n y1r2 requires that agents put a weight to private information bounded away from zero. Obviously, to characterize precisely the rate of convergence under general circumstances is a much more difficult task which is left for future research.
Two other topics deserve further research: the effects of endogenous and costly information acquisition on the learning process, and learning in a changing environment where the unknown parameter follows a stochastic process.
APPENDIX

Market Learning
Normality and the recursive structure of the model imply that q s in Ž < . s␣ s q 1y␣ , with ␣ s r q .
Ž . Ž .
n i n ny1 n n y1
